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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

QUESTAR PIPELINE COMPANY,
Petitioner,
Case No. 900592
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION,
Respondent.

REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER
QUESTAR PIPELINE COMPANY
Questar Pipeline Company (Questar) respectfully submits its reply brief in
response to the brief of respondent Utah State Tax Commission (the Commission),
filed June 20, 1991.
INTRODUCTION
The thrust of Questar's request for review of the action of the Tax Commission is that it seeks a fair and lawful evaluation of the fair market value (FMV)
of its property, as required by Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-102(6) (1987)

As set

forth in its Opening Brief (the "Questar O.B."), Questar believes the Commission
has reached a company-wide evaluation of $296 million by means that do not
comport with the Utah Administrative Procedures Act and applicable case law.

The Commission's responsive brief does not overcome the fundamental shortcomings of the Commission's original December 3, 1990, order: The order does not
meet minimal standards of arriving at rational conclusions from the evidence and
the applicable law, nor does it provide a perceptible line of reasoning by which
the taxpayer and the reviewing court can evaluate the Commission's final $296
million evaluation.
I.

THE THEORY ADVANCED IN THE COMMISSION BRIEF
WOULD PERMIT NEARLY UNBRIDLED AGENCY
DISCRETION TO DETERMINE TAXPAYERS' LIABILITY
IN THE NAME OF "EXERCISING JUDGMENT"

The real foundation of the Commission's Brief is found on pages 36-43,
where it argues that the final determination of property value from the various
methods under the consideration is a matter of the Commission's judgment.
Questar does not contest the legal principle of according the Commission some
deference to the expertise it has in specialized, technical areas.

On the other

hand, the position advanced in its brief would, in the name of judgment and
agency expertise, give carte blanche to the Commission to assign nearly any number to the taxpayer's property as long as some witness alluded to a range of values
containing the number. Questar does not believe the UAPA and applicable case
law is so permissive.
A. Standards Under the Milne and Mountain States Legal Foundation Cases.
The Commission seems unwilling to recognize that it must treat taxpayers
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in a way that is accountable. This Court has pointedly addressed this principle in
Milne Truck Lines, Inc. v. PSC, 720 P.2d 1373, 1378-79 (Utah 1986), and Mountain States Legal Foundation v. PSC, 636 P.2d 1047, 1058 (Utah 1981). In those
cases the Court established that state agencies must provide those they regulate
and the reviewing courts not only with findings of ultimate facts, but findings of
all material subordinate factual issues.1
The Court stated in Mountain States, and reaffirmed in D and H Real
Estate Co. v. PSC, 784 P.2d 158, 159 (Utah 1989):
To enable this Court to determine whether an order is arbitrary and
capricious, the Commission must make findings of fact that are
sufficiently detailed to apprise the parties and the Court of the basis
for the Commission's decision . . . .
For this Court to sustain an order, the findings must be sufficiently detailed to demonstrate that the Commission has properly
arrived at the ultimate factual findings and has properly applied the
governing rules of law to those findings.
The Milne case elaborates on the obligations of an agency to provide reasoned
decision-making:
The Commission cannot discharge its statutory responsibilities
without making findings of fact on all necessary ultimate issues
under the governing statutory standards. It is also essential that the
Commission make subsidiary findings in sufficient detail that the
critical subordinate factual issues are highlighted and resolved in
such a fashion as to demonstrate that there is a logical and legal basis

Although these are pre-UAPA cases, the principles of agency accountability
that are discussed are at least as strongly applicable under the UAPA as under
former agency-review standards. See Vali Convalescent and Care Institutions v.
Division of Health Care Financing, 797 P.2d 438, 443 n.6 (Utah App. 1990).
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for the ultimate conclusions. The importance of complete, accurate,
and consistent findings of fact is essential to a proper determination
by an administrative agency. To that end, findings should be sufficiently detailed to disclose the steps by which the ultimate factual
conclusions, or conclusions of mixed fact and law, are reached . . . .
Without such findings, this Court cannot perform its duty of reviewing the Commission's order in accordance with established legal
principles and of protecting the parties and the public from arbitrary
and capricious administrative action.
720 P.2d at 1378 (emphasis added). In some ways, the Milne case is similar to
the case currently before the Court.

As did the Public Service Commission in

Milne, the Tax Commission has made findings only on the barest of ultimate
issues—here, the ultimate evaluation of $296 million—and has failed to provide
"subsidiary findings in sufficient detail that the critical subordinate factual issues
are highlighted and resolved." As Questar has argued in its opening brief and in
this reply brief, the Commission's actions do not provide "complete, accurate and
consistent findings of fact . . . essential to a proper determination" of FMV.
B. Commission "Judgment" Has Not Addressed Subordinate Factual Issues.
Any fair and reasonable analysis of the evidence must come to grips with
the financial realities facing a rate-regulated company such as Questar.

Quite

simply, the Commission has not disposed of pivotal subordinate issues either in its
final order or in its brief. In the context of Milne and Mountain States, the Commission never explained such fundamental matters as:
1. How is it possible for Questar's FMV to be 41% higher than the rate-
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base/cost value2 placed on the Company by the rate-regulating agency for purposes of producing a rate of return to investors that is comparable to other investments of comparable risk?3
Given that Questar's revenue and income stream are wholly determined by
the ratemaking procedures of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (the
"cost method"), what is it about this company that would induce a knowledgeable
and willing investor/buyer to pay 41% more than the rate base on which the
FERC has determined a just and reasonable rate of return may be earned? (See
Questar's O.B. at 16-25.)
The Commission's Brief still has given no answer to this question, except
to state and restate in conclusory fashion that the Commission believes the income
method is the most reliable method, the cost method the least reliable and that the
stock-and-debt (market) method "tests the reliability" of the cost method.

The

sum total of the Commission's reasoning on these foundational matters is found in
Stipulated rate-base/cost = $210 million; Commission evaluation = $296
million. ($296 - $210) + $210 = 41%.
3

It is something of an irony that the Division of Public Utilities and the Tax
Commission—two agencies of the same sovereign, the State of Utah—pull the
corporate citizen in opposite directions when determining the value of the company. As an agency of the State to generate revenues, the Tax Commission has a
bias toward increased valuation of facilities. As one of the watchdogs of ultimate
utility rates in Utah, the Division of Public Utilities tends to take positions that
would keep the valuation of the pipeline's assets lower—the lower the rate base,
the lower the resultant rates. The rate-regulated taxpayer is caught in the middle.
In a super-equitable world, one might require the State's agencies to concur between themselves what single value the State would use for both purposes.
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two sparse paragraphs of its order (R. 9, H 8-9), which do not provide even the
most rudimentary roadmap to its analysis of the facts and circumstances before it.
2. How is the Commission's ultimate reliance on the income method and
the conclusion that the stock-and-debt method is an independent "test" of the cost
method reconciled with Prof. Hal Heaton's uncontested evidence that, except for
minor differences, the "income" method is no more than the stock-and-debt
method in disguise?4 (R. 65, 262, Questar O.B. at 25-29.)
3.

How did the Commission reconcile the fundamentally different ap-

proaches of the Division's witnesses to FMV? What witness, what evidence and
what theories from the Property Tax Division's diversity of witnesses did the
Commission rely on? For example, Prof. Hanke and Mr. Prawitt had a major
philosophic disagreement about the applicability of the stock-and-debt method.
(R. 201-02.) Another example: Did the Commission rely on Prof. Hanke's and
Mr. Goodwin's totally irrelevant examples of the California houses that might
have a market value completely different from their replacement or cost values?
(Tr. 126, 205-06.) Since the hypothetical houses were not subject to original-cost
ratemaking constraints, the Commission could hardly rely on this "evidence" as
the basis for rejecting the position that the rate base for a FERC-regulated company and its FMV are closely related. Did it?

4

For example, Prof. Hanke, who espoused total reliance on the stock-and-debt
method, could not take issue with Prof. Heaton's demonstration. (R. 150.)
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did it square his tenacious and implacable insistence on a $300 million evaluation
with his disregard foi the spirit and letter of tl ic settlement framework?

Mr.

grasp 'the significance of the stipulation and that he did not consider the iagreed to
values in the context of the stipulation. 5 (See also discussion in § IV below )

no dispute over the formulaic detei mination of this method under FERC rate

The following colloquy is particularly revealing (R. 161-62):
Q
Nov , our [Questar's] case was that m e were given the
three i lumbers, arid w e agreed K it'll the Property Tax Division three
numbers, 210, 303, and. 312, to form the basis of some sort of a
composite result. We engaged an expert witness to make an analysis
of that process with those numbers and [he] came up with a relatively narrow range. Now, we presumefd] that the Property Tax
Division would do exactly the same thing . [, , To] take those three
numbers as given numbers and through some; procedure that is de
scribable and can. be looked at, would find a correlated value that's
consistent with the Property Tax Division's approach to correlation,
generally. Did you do that?
Did I do what? I Hunk I missal I he question

•"

Did you take these three numbers and forget about where they
come from and decide what was the relative reliability from your
point of view and derive a correlated value, a weighted value?
If you 're talki ng about the $292 million value?
I" Jo, I'lii talking about Column D [of Exhibit 1.]
Did I, or can I?

• •

Did you?
I I ;:: III: na e not . . . .

regulation? Indeed, it is the least subjective of the methods because of its regulatory origin. (R. 75-76, 102.)
The Commission's answer to its failure to address these and other subordinate factual issues and to provide a logical chain of reasoning is its theory that the
Court should defer to its conclusory "judgment" of the ultimate factual issue and
that "[v]aluation is an art, not a science." (Commission Brief at 41.)

Merely

characterizing its tax-assessment obligations as an "art" does not allow the Commission to escape accountability for the results it imposes. A two-paragraph statement of conclusions does not measure up to requirements of Milne, Mountain
States and Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(g) and (h) (1989).
C. There Is No Rational Explanation of the Choice of a FMVof$296 Million.
In its Brief (page 43), the Commission argues that the record supports the
finding of a $296 million FMV because it is "squarely within the range of value
proffered by the Property Tax Division" and that "it should be enough to simply
choose a value with[in] the range of values presented to the Commission." No
legal authority is cited for this claim to an extraordinarily broad license.
First, to "simply choose a value" does not allow the taxpayer and the Court
to evaluate whether there are rational chains of logic and reasoning and findings of
subordinate facts to determine if the Commission has been arbitrary and capricious. Milne, 720 P.2d at 1378. The Commission's claim that a value picked out
of a range of values discussed by witnesses at the hearing satisfies the UAPA's
-8-

substantial-evidence test seriously misconstrues the standard. Because the ultimate

subordinate facts that 'the Commission never addressed, "the Commission's action
cannot be sustained. 6
S e i • o i in , I

11 in i • III" 1111| M • i I i,

II i in ii 1 > i \' i ' , i ii»i in i 1111 in I 1

111" m i l n mi ' i in mi in i| il 11 in in ,i

Il I 11

i i mi in I "I,

Division witi less who discussed actual values was M r . Praw itt, who stated direct'•• squarely in the face of changes in the methods' values over the course of the
eeilinp,
TIUUJS,

ill I Ii "IIINII

( R . 1' 71 9 7.)

.
O'lil) oi i soi ne

D.iiis did he allow Iktl
\\)W

In ii. II

IUMIII'I

u

follow

thc value could
ii-

nl III /

(uestioning from Commissionei
be befwu.'ii $290 and $310, < »

I \ i laiipiusLS added].)

Still, the Commission apparently has relied on Mi

Prawitt's testimony -

since n: ici othei witness except Pi of I leaton made any concrete recommendation
nn a witne<^ whose K.

testimony on the correlation

xhibited

ipiilated

facts and a logically inconsistent: approach to the anal) "sis that could not b

I

upon by a reasonable fact i inder.

6

There is nothing in the order to distinguish the Commission's claimed exercise of judgment from simply accepting, without question, its staffs recommendation. See, e g , Mountain Fuel Supply Co, v. PSCf 662 P.2d 878, 887-88 (Wyo.
1983) (coin t couldn't discern whether PSC 'had automatically, uniformly, and
unlawfully adopted its staffs recommendations on the utilities 9 rates of return,
independent of the evidence).
_9_

The point is not that the Commission must pick one number that was
testified to by a specific witness, but that it must exercise its responsibility to
assess the record as a whole and arrive at subordinate and ultimate conclusions by
rational and discernable means, applying the law to all the evidence before it.
This, Questar believes, the Commission has not done.
The fundamental problem with the Commission's claim of license to engage
in judgment and art is that it camouflages arbitrary and capricious actions. The
essence of the Commission's arguments on pages 36-43 of its Brief is that it has
essentially free rein to choose nearly any value for the FMV so long as one of its
staff or their retained witnesses testifies to a range that includes the final number.
No reasonable administrative review standard should allow this liberty, much less
the more stringent review standards adopted by the Utah Legislature—the UAPA.
D. Standard of Review
Although Questar believes that the Commission action is sufficiently defective that it would not have passed the tests of lawfulness under the pre-UAPA
statutory framework, the UAPA—with its wider grant to the Court to consider
evidence "when viewed in light of the whole record"—provides the standard of
review for this case, which was initiated after January 1, 1988.
The Commission Brief (page 46), on the other hand, urges the Court to
apply the standards articulated in Vali Convalescent and Care Institutions v.
Division of Health Care Financing, 797 P.2d 438 (Utah App. 1990), and a previ-10-

ous case cited in Vali, USX Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 781 P.2d 883 (Utah
App. 1989). Both cases are pre-UAPA cases, and the standards articulated and
discussed there are not directly applicable to the case before the Court. Judge
Orme points this out in Vali by noting that "somewhat less deference is accorded
in connection with the review of an agency's factual determinations when the
Administrative Procedures Act is applicable." 797 P.2d at 443 n.6.
Even weaker is the Commission's urging on the same page of its brief that
the Court adopt the review standards discussed by the Washington intermediate
appeals court in cases that did not involve statutory provisions that are equivalent
to the UAPA.
II. WHEN THE EVIDENCE IS MARSHALLED,
THE COMMISSION'S $296 MILLION EVALUATION
DOES NOT PASS THE APPLICABLE UAPA TESTS

As the Commission Brief correctly points out (page 10), this Court and the
Court of Appeals have required parties who believe that agency decisions are not
supported by substantial evidence when the record is viewed as a whole to "marshall the evidence" to make such a showing. First National Bank of Boston v.
County Board of Equalization, 799 P.2d 1163, 1165 (Utah 1990); Grace Drilling
Co. v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah App. 1989). But, no matter how
much evidence is marshalled in this proceeding, the words of the Bank of Boston
opinion apply here: "Nothing in the record indicates how the Tax Commission
arrived at the figures" that the Commission chose as the FMV of Questar's
-11-

system.
Further, Questar does not believe that the Bank of Boston case stands for
the proposition that the raw quantity of evidence automatically satisfies the substantial-evidence test. If that were the case, there would be no place for considerations of quality of the evidence. To put it another way, the Commission's theory
of substantial evidence would not take account of questions of logical consistency,
the reasonableness of the conclusions and the applicability of the law, as required
implicitly by the UAPA and explicitly by cases such as Milne, Mountain States
and Hurley v. Board of Review, 767 P.2d 524, 527 (Utah 1988) (questions of
mixed fact and law subject to a "reasonableness standard").7
As discussed in more detail in Questar's Opening Brief, (1) it is not clear
what evidence the Commission's December 3, 1990, decision relied on, and (2)
any rational evaluation of the evidence, when the record is considered as a whole,
would not pass a reasonableness test.

The latter observation obtains if for no

other reason than the result does not account for the enormous disparity between
the Commission's $296 million evaluation and the $210 million investment base
on which the Company's revenue and income streams are determined on a justand-reasonable basis by the FERC.

7

Hurley is a pre-UAPA case, but the mixed-law-and-fact standard is still
applicable in the UAPA framework. Pro-Benefit Staffing, Inc. v. Board of Review, 775 P.2d 439, 441-42 (Utah App. 1989).
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III. THE COMMISSION BRIEF'S DISCUSSION OF THE
COST METHOD FURTHER CONFIRMS THE UNLAWFULNESS
OF ITS APPARENT REJECTION OF ITS USE

The substantive argument in the Commission Brief commences with what
purports to be a discussion of the cost method, but immediately proceeds totally to
mischaracterize the cost method used in the proceeding as the replacement cost:
"what it would cost for a willing buyer to reconstruct the subject property."
Commission Brief at 13 (emphasis added). How can the taxpayer or this Court
feel that the taxpayer has been subjected to a fair, impartial and knowledgeable
evaluation of the evidence when one of the premier issues—the role of the depreciated original cost (rate base) evaluation, the "cost method"—is treated with
such carelessness in the Commission's Brief? If the Commission gave no more
consideration to the merit of the cost-method arguments than is indicated by the
treatment in its brief, then its claims that it "properly considered all evidence and
gave all due thought and consideration to Questar's arguments and experts' opinions"8 ring hollow indeed.
If the issue had been whether the Commission should place primary weight
on the value of reconstruction costs, then the Commission's rejection of the cost
method would be justifiable; Questar would agree that there is relatively little
nexus between that value and FMV for an original-cost rate-base-regulated inter-

Commission Brief at 45.
-13-

state pipeline.
But, of course, that was never the issue.
cost was never discussed in the proceedings.

Replacement or reconstruction
To the extent the Commission's

Brief represents its understanding of the issue and rejection of the rate-base /cost
method as unreliable, the Commission has made an error of the first magnitude.
If not, it does not speak well of the Commission's care in treating the issues that
have brought the parties before the Court.
Apparently in support of this erroneous definition of the cost method used
in the case, the Commission's Brief (page 13) then cited a case that squarely supports Questar's position that FMV appraisals of rate-regulated companies must
focus on the fact that companies whose rates and income streams are strictly
constrained to produce a return on utility-type rate base.

Pacific Power & Light

Co. v. Dept. of Revenue, 308 Or. 49, 775 P.2d 303 (1989), found that the ratebase /cost method was a reasonable measure of FMV.

The Oregon Supreme

Court's qualitative analysis (in a de novo review) is particularly instructive, because it was faced with a central-assessment case similar to the one before this
Court. Contrary to the Utah Tax Commission's summary dismissal of the ratebase/cost method as the "least reliable" of the three methods, the Oregon court
looked at the clear connection between the HCLD9—i.e., the rate base—and

9

HCLD: Historic cost less depreciation—the "cost approach," derived from
the utility's annual report to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. Id. at
-14-

FMV to conclude:
Accepting that . . . what we are searching for is what a hypothetical
willing buyer of this property would pay to a hypothetical willing
seller, it seems clear to us that a willing buyer of the plant and
equipment would be agreeable to paying a figure close to HCLD,
because the buyer could then earn off all that expenditure.
A weight of 45% was assigned to the cost method in the Oregon case.10 It is
significant that specific weights were assigned so that the actual "correlated" value
could be determined from the three individual components. Id. at 312.
This is contrary to the Utah Tax Commission's approach of refusing to
state weighting factors for the methods, depending on its judgment to divine a
proper FMV.

According to the Commission, "no 'weighting' formula is re-

quired, " notwithstanding that it never addressed the issue of "the moving target."
Commission Brief at 45.

Compare discussion in Questar O. B. at 33-40. See

also, e.g., Wyo. Tax Comm'n Rules and Regs., ch. XXII, § 14(c): "Any taxpayer . . . , upon request, will be provided with . . . [t]he relative weight assigned to each of the methods if more than one is used and an explanation of the
weighting used."

307. This is the same rate base used in the Questar case.
10

Although the specific choice of 45% is not particularly significant here
because no party contested the percentages, the court's analysis confirmed that a
substantial weight should be given to this rate-case evaluation method. If the issue
had been contested, it is hard to speculate whether the Oregon Supreme Court
would have attached a weight higher than 45% on the basis of its finding that
investors are obviously limited by the rate base (HCLD).
-15-

It is also notable that the Oregon court's qualitative analysis of the cost
method for an FERC-regulated company went on to observe that there was record
evidence "to the effect that regulation to some extent diminishes the earning potential of regulated property and, therefore, a willing buyer would wish to discount
the property to some degree." Id.

This, of course, was dictum in the Pacific

Power decision, but it illustrates the intuitive understanding of the constraints
placed on an investor/buyer and further illustrates that the Utah Commission's
summary disposal of the cost method is an abuse of its discretion.
Finally, as a minor but indicative point, the Commission Brief—presumably
in rationalizing its minimal use of the cost method—states that Questar's FMV is
"more accurately measured by the income method and the stock and debt method
since both of these methods are market based." Commission Brief at 4 (emphasis
added). This is simply not correct. The income method is not market-based, and
no witness so testified.11

This is another example of Commission carelessness

with the evidence.
IV.

ARGUMENTS PUT FORTH IN THE COMMISSION
BRIEF EVIDENCE A MISUNDERSTANDING OR
MISUSE OF THE STIPULATION

In an attempt to simplify the case and focus on an issue on which Questar
and the Property Tax had material disagreement, the parties stipulated (1) that the
n

The Division's own witness was emphatic about this: "So it is not a market
based method of evaluation . . . ." (R. 125.)
-16-

overall FMV evaluation should be derived form the values obtained from the three
"standard" evaluation methods (cost, stock-and-debt, and income) and (2) the
values of the three methods and the accuracy of their derivations would not be at
issue. (R. 380-81.)12 Thus, the framework agreed to by the parties was a substitute for the presentation of full, comprehensive appraisals13 by the parties. Accordingly, no witness sponsored a full appraisal, because the purpose of the evidentiary proceeding was limited to the determination of a proper combination of
the three values, i.e., the "correlation" of the stipulated values, to obtain Questar's FMV. The proceeding was thus abbreviated to issues involving the reliability and propriety of the various methods in determining FMV.
The Commission's Brief indicates a material misunderstanding or misuse of
the stipulated facts and issues.

For example, the brief (pages 37-38) criticizes

Questar witness Prof. Heaton because he did not conduct a complete appraisal.
But the stipulation obviated a complete appraisal, requiring all witnesses to start at
a point far down the road from conducting a complete appraisal. Again, that was
the point of the stipulation, and its operational effect was to provide a common
starting point for each party and witness—one that did not involve a comprehen12

A copy of the Stipulation of Facts and Issues is attached as Addendum A to
this Reply Brief.
13a

Appraisal," as used in the Commission Brief, apparently refers to a complete assembly of company data and information, the derivation of all the components and application of appropriate methods of estimating FMV, and correlation
or weighting of the results of the separate methods.
-17-

sive appraisal. No one conducted a complete appraisal that was part of the poststipulation proceedings and record.

Certainly, Division witnesses Goodwin and

Hanke did not conduct any appraisal. Their testimony was almost entirely theoretical or advisory in nature, limited generally to commenting on the theory of the
methods at issue. Nor did Mr. Prawitt sponsor an appraisal (even though he may
have at one time performed one that produced different individual results than
those stipulated to.)
It is fundamentally inconsistent with the established facts in the case, i.e.,
the stipulation, to reject or minimize the import of Prof. Heaton's evidence on the
basis of his not having performed a complete appraisal. An arm of the Commission (the Division) entered into a stipulation of issues that explicitly eliminated a
portion of the potential issues.

On brief, the Commission then explains that it

rejected or accorded less weight to Prof. Heaton's evidence because he did not
address issues that were stipulated to. This is grossly unfair to the witness and to
the taxpayer. It is notable that the Commission (apparently) did not correspondingly discount the evidence of Prof. Hanke and Mr. Goodwin; yet, they too
conducted no appraisal. The Commission's logic on this point is not supportable.
Prof. Heaton, as did Division witnesses, addressed the relative merits of the
three component methods. His testimony and exhibits were, as the framework of
the stipulation called for, based on an analytic method for determining the most
reliable (i. e., the best) estimator of FMV. Although there may be other legitimate
-18-

methods for addressing the problem, it is an abuse of agency discretion to discount
or reject a witness's evidence on the basis of its mischaracterization of the process
and of the witness's testimony.
The Commission's summary dismissal of the only comprehensive, analytic
attempt to solve the problem defined by the stipulation relies on a mischaracterization of key evidence and its view that property tax determinations are an "art, not
a science." This is arbitrary and capricious and not in compliance with the requirements of Milne and Mountain States.
On a similar point, it is contrary to the framework of the stipulation for the
Commission to claim (page 25) that Questar agreed that the value of its property
is as much as $300 million simply because those are the stipulated values of two
of the methods. The parties did not concede the relative merits of the stipulated
values. That was the entire point of the controversy. "[T]he parties do not . . .
agree on the relative merits of the individual approaches."

(R. 380, 1 1(b).)

Thus, the Commission's logic, when applied to the Property Tax Division, would
imply they agree that the value of the Company is as low as $210 million.
V. THE COMMISSION'S BRIEF DOES NOT JUSTIFY
DIFFERENT TREATMENT OF THE STOCK-AND-DEBT
METHOD FOR QUESTAR, VIS-A-VIS NORTHWEST PIPELINE

At pages 19-25, the Commission Brief tries to justify why it has accorded
materially different treatment of the stock-and-debt method to Northwest Pipeline
Corporation (Northwest) and Questar.
-19-

The evidence in this case concerning the stock-and-debt method establishes
beyond reasonable argument that a direct evaluation of Questar, as a second-level,
minority subsidiary of a diversified parent, through the aggregate value of its
common stock and debt is impossible. It is fiirther established that any attempt to
assign a value to Questar by the stock-and-debt method will require an allocation
of some percentage of the parent to the subsidiary or the attribution of characteristics of other "comparable" companies to Questar. (See discussion and citations in
Questar O.B. at 25-29.)
The conclusion is inescapable that, on the facts in this record (and not for
the hypothetical publicly traded company for which the stock-and-debt method
may be effective), the stock-and-debt method is not a reliable indicator of FMV.
It is not reliable because it is indirect and produces a wide range of potential
values, as a function of the particular allocation factors or indices that are used.
(R. 260-61.)
Thus, the Commission's material reliance on the method as a "test" of
another method is not based on the quality of evidence that would persuade a reasonable person who understood the rate-regulatory limitations placed on the earning
value of Questar. On the merits under the facts of this case, the Commission's
substantial reliance on the stock-and-debt method in the face of the fundamental
role played by its FERC rate base in determining the earning power of Questar is
not supported by substantial evidence when the record as a whole is considered.
-20-

Further, the Commission's somewhat inscrutable treatment of the Northwest
Pipeline Corporation case, as discussed in the Questar Opening Brief (pages
27-29) and its Supplement to the Opening Brief, detracts further from any justifiable reliance on the stock-and-debt method. There is no dispute that the Commission was mistaken when it claimed that the common stock of Northwest's
parent, The Williams Companies, was not publicly traded. (Commission Brief at
25.) But the Commission attempts to rationalize away its inexplicable error by
arguing, in effect: So what if we didn't have the facts straight, the reasoning was
OK.
There are two major problems with the explanation in the Commission
Brief.

(1) How could the Commission not be aware of a factual matter that it

claims is so vital to the analysis of the applicability of the stock-and-debt method
to a major centrally assessed company?14 A partial answer is that the erroneous
"the parent is not publicly traded" argument appears to be an afterthought to the
Commission's rejection of the stock-and-debt method, not the primary evaluation.
As pointed out in Questar's Initial Brief, the thrust of the analysis was that the
allocations necessary to evaluate a company two subsidiary levels down rendered
the method unreliable.

The secondary (but incorrect) observation was given as

further confirmation. Why else would the Commission begin this secondary point

14

This may also raise a question concerning the level of deference to be accorded to an agency's expertise.
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with "Further, there is no specific information available . . . ."? 15
(2) More fundamentally, the Commission's treatment of Questar produces
the irreconcilable inequity that two extensive interstate pipelines with major operations and property in Utah and otherwise similarly situated are subjected to substantially different taxation treatment. This does not measure up to the standards
of UAPA § 63-46b-16(4)(h)(i) and (iii). The Commission's basis for the inconsistency is not "fair and rational."
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth in this Reply Brief, Questar believes that the
Commission Brief has not established the lawfulness of the December 3, 1990,
order, and seeks an order of the Court providing the relief sought in Questar's
Opening Brief.

15

The full context from the Commission's order was:
The parent corporation raises capital by the issuance of its own debt
and that capital is then utilized in the business operations of the
Williams Company [sic] and its several subsidiaries, including Petitioner. Therefore, it is very difficult to determine what portion of
the stock and debt of the Williams Company should be allocated to
Petitioner. Further, there is no specific information available concerning the market value of the non public stock.

Questar O.B., Addendum C, at 6.
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Respectfully submitted,
QUESTAR PIPELINE COMPA N S

Gary G. Sackett,
Associate General Counsel
Questar Corporation
180 East First South Street
P.O. Box 11150
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147
Counsel for
Questar Pipeline Company,
a Questar Corporation subsidiary
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BEFORE THE STATE TAX COMMISSION OF U T ^

A

£^^

QUESTAR PIPEI I NE COMPA*
Petitioner,
STIPULATION OF FACTS
AND ISSUES

v.

Appeal No. 88-1456

PROPERTY TAX DIVISION OF
THE STATE TAX COMMISSION
OF UTAH,
Respoi idei it.

.:: vr.L- ;•::;; ,)\ narrowing the issues that have been raised in this proceeding,
Questar Pip!, .ne Compam and :he Properft Tux Division of the State Tax Commisv -1 oi l"iah

.

^:'

\"e Division) stipulate tu me iolluwnig facts and issues for purposes of

' ;.v- parties st.puaOv/ oan ::.L oiree approaches to the total assessment

of the Company's taxable property shall be those generally referred t

as the .\ :

method, the r^ome method and the market i or stock-and-debt) method. The partus
further agree that these three approaches Yield ihe following estimates oi Questar
Pipe 1 i i 1 i"s totz 1 syste i i :i • ira 11 Ie f o i 1:1 ie ta xal11 e yc a i 1,lJXS,
Cost Method
Income Method
Stock-and-Debt Method

$210,492,693
$303,000,000
$312,321,375

(b) Having stipulated to the amounts in § 1(a), the parties do not necessarily
agree on the methods, assumptions or variables that were used to derive such \ alues,
nor do they leree . •* f : e * * a* \- *ocra^ O\ ihe mdividual approaches,
1

ill] n i l a l K i n if ni i n \

•^ .

: " * } ' ; * • • "

, . .
-*

s

, .*>

' .L^:S

tu present anil pursue such positions, methods, approaches and arguments as it sees
fit in an\ other proceeding.
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(c)

In consideration of stipulating to a market indicator different from that

stated in the Divisioi i"s /!\,

';», 1988, Notice of Assessment, tl le parties fort! ici agree

tion ol market-value indicators that emphasizes or relies on the relative difference
between the income and stock-and-debt methods to imply or conclude that the cost
method is inferior
sidera: * ;
pa*".

r •.,

.

/*

> should be entitled to a smaller or greater con-

,;,iv ,lH • does i not in ai :t) s* aj limit tl me i ight of eithei

<: , ': . / : .. n i :\ ig the strength 01 weakness of the cost method

on any other grounds or theory.
T" .- pa:t::^ ajiee :!MI V

*

"tat: illocatior

correlated system n r ^ ' ' ^ due \h<w\ >e 48.04%,
,uh

r

Questar Pipeline's

;o r Questar Pipeline's Utah
;

ICV1

I )-

subjei: to r , lii;... determination o* the correlated marke: \ :.... • *? t

::\

property in tllis proceeding.
3

'The sole issue to be litigated in this proceeding is the "correlation" ot the

three values stipulated to in § 1 above, lionii which a single total-company assessed
\aluation is i

he determined,

fuich party ma\ advance and pursue such evidence

.: id argument as it deems appropriate (subject to § 1(c)) in establishing the method
.* -\h the three stipulated values should be used to determine a single "c ai
related" value.
This M>pul u, r "s enteie.l into "his '29? day o1 Septemhei 1989.
Respectfully submitted,
PROPERTY TAX DIVISION,
STATE TAX COMMISSION OF UTAH

QUESTAR PIPELINE COMPANY

a
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State o f I hah

/Gary G. Sackett
U
•
Attorney for
Questar Pipeline Company
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